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Abstract. This paper continues my development of philosophy of religion as 
multi-disciplinary comparative research. An earlier paper, “Wittgenstein and 
Contemporary Belief-Credence Dualism” compared Wittgensteinian 
reflections on religious discourse and praxis with B-C dualism as articulated 
by its leading proponents. While some strong commonalities were elaborated 
that might help to bridge Continental and Analytic approaches in philosophy 
of religion, Wittgenstein was found to be a corrective to B-C dualism 
especially as regards the epistemology of  “risky” doxastic faith ventures. 
This paper aims to further elaborate a basis for improved dialogue between 
philosophers, theologians and scholars in special sciences which study 
religion. I call this basis the triangulated model the ABC’s of religious 




1. Dialogue across Disciplines 
This paper continues my development of philosophy of religion as multi-disciplinary 
comparative research. An earlier paper, “Wittgenstein and Contemporary Belief-Credence 
Dualism” compared Wittgensteinian reflections on religious discourse and praxis with B-C 
dualism as articulated by its leading proponents Lara Buchak and Liz Jackson.1 It found some 
strength and promise in the B-C dualist proposal, especially in regard to the manner in which 
their doxastic state pluralism –the recognition that “beliefs and credences are two epistemic tools 
used for different purposes” invites a more cooperative approach in philosophy of religion. The 
B-C dualists propose to distinguish qualitative, affective B-reasoning from quantifiable C-
reasoning. But it was also argued that their application of this B-C dualism to philosophy of 
religion results in a still unbalanced account, and thus a serious weakness. It allows religious 
particularists to defend their rationality by appeal to “B-reasoning” such as trust in a particular 
religious testimonial tradition, while routinely ignoring aetiological information and challenges 
which might arise from empirical evidence of aetiological symmetries in testimonial uptake 
across testimonial faith traditions. 
So, the present paper motivates and sketches a fuller alternative to B-C dualism, within 
the same spirit of improving the dialogue. It is perhaps best seen as a counter-proposal to the 
proposal made by the B-C dualists that doxastic state pluralism would improve discussion of 
the epistemology of religious belief. Neither synchronic, probabilistic C-reasoning nor 
affective, valuative B-reasoning are found to take a proper concern with aetiological 
symmetries among adherents of different testimonial faith traditions.2 I introduce A-evidence, 
or A-reasoning, to address this lacuna.3 Aetiological concerns are concerns with processes and 
strategies of belief formation, and this is much of what psychology studies, including 
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psychology of religion. My counter-proposal therefore pushes doxastic state pluralism still 
further. I show why it invites the discussion of risk which B-C dualism introduces, while going 
further by insisting that doxastic risk also be understood also together with research in the 
human sciences which study religion, including cognitive science of religion [hereafter CSR]. 
This means that doxastic risk needs to be considered in relationship to what aetiological 
information helps us to understand about differences between safe and unsafe strategies of 
inquiry. It also means that existential risk, or risk for the believer, is not the only risk-related 
concern: Where beliefs involve others, real or potential epistemic justice/injustice is always a 
risk-related concern as well. 
The Triangulated model which results from taking the truth-tracking (safe or risky) 
aetiology of our beliefs as another central concern for the epistemology of religious beliefs, I 
term the ABC’s of the epistemics of religious belief [Table 1 below]. The Triangulated model 
gives each way of taking evidence, a permanent seat at the table. It is thus proposed as 
modeling a more balanced and fruitful dialogue among theologians, philosophers, and 
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researchers in human sciences which study religion.
 
I will use “epistemics of [domain x]” and “epistemology of [domain x] beliefs” 
synonymously, but where both terms acknowledge the constant need to balance form and 
content in the scholarly study of beliefs, including (and perhaps especially) religion. As 
Dominic Marbaniang (2010) points out, “The term ‘epistemics’ was coined by Alvin I. 
Goldman (1978) to contrast it with traditional epistemology that didn’t take modern 
psychological studies in cognition into consideration.” Epistemics concerns itself, according to 
Goldman, “with the interpersonal and institutional processes that affect the creation, 
transmission, and reception of information, misinformation, and partial information.”4 
Goldman’s adoption of this term was part of his prescription for social epistemology, in 
contrast to the methodological individualism which had been an unexamined assumption of 
many epistemologists. The study of religious ideas is one domain of epistemics, that is, one 
domain of which the study of groups and collectives is illuminating.5 One of the immediate 
consequences of the ABC’s of religious epistemics is that we should take religious, 
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philosophical, etc.  “contrariety” as the default description of psychographic differences in 
domains of controversial views, not “disagreement.” What counts as a disagreement is itself a 
contested question, and needs to meet conditions.6  
Section 2 reviews the proposal of B-C dualists to distinguish faith-based belief as 
affective B-reasoning, from quantitative, probative C-reasoning and its guiding norm that one’s 
“credences” (low or high) should always match or “fit” with an objective assessment of one’s 
evidence. The connections which were made between the B-C dualist’s proposal with 
Wittgenstein two ways of treating evidence, as “criterial” (grammatical), or “symptomatic” 
(inductive; evidenced) are also briefly reviewed.7  
Section 3 picks up from the conclusions of that earlier paper that, while there is much to 
admire in the doxastic state pluralism of Lara Buchak and Liz Jackson, their “dualism” retains 
much of the problems of the eliminative or reductionist accounts. Doxastic or epistemic risks, 
which Buchak so nicely points to as central to faith-based assents, are largely acknowledge to 
be existential risks. More specifically, the dualist proposal allows little relevance to aetiological 
information bearing on how they and other persons acquire and hold their religious beliefs. B-
evidence is sensitive to certain things like personal experience and testimony, but should not at 
the same time be as insensitive to what we will term A-reasoning and A-evidence. We will use 
“A” for “aetiological,” construing this broadly enough to include information stemming from 
general facts about human thought processes (including bias studies), and from sciences which 
study religion bearing upon the proximate causes of belief, along with functional explanations 
and critical or supporting genealogical accounts of concepts.  
Dualism as presented by its leading proponents lends itself to leaving the aetiology and 
proximate causes of belief out of account, and thus largely disregarding the special sciences 
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which study religious belief and unbelief. This insensitivity, I argue, skews both the judgment 
of agents, and the application of the B-C dualist proposal to the epistemology of religious 
belief. Whereas philosophy of religion requires maintaining a proper balance between form and 
content, dualism presents a hyper-focus on content and religious particularity, as the expense of 
formal concerns.  
Section 4 sketches more detail into how the Triangulated model, as a positive proposal 
to improve discourse between theologians, philosophers, and others, extends but also amends 
the C-P dualists’ proposal. The two proposals have a good deal of overlap as I try to show, but 
the Triangulated model builds in some ‘checks and balances’ which I see as missing in B-C 
dualist model. The main issue between these two proposals is not just about different kinds of 
evidence, but of how a body of evidence is taken: The B-taking, C-taking, and A-taking are 
often each possible in regard to beliefs in domains of controversial views. Each way of taking 
evidence provides perspective on the other two, and this means that the Triangulated model 
invites empirical study of religious belief and unbelief, and a more balanced discussion since 
the “form” as well as the “content” of belief each receive their due. Developing the three sides 
(B – C, C – A, and B – A), and the manner in which each type way of taking evident both 
tempers and complements the other two, will give us opportunity to see how Wittgenstein’s 
reflections show concern with each.  
Section 5 turns more directly to the question of which model, the Triangulate, or the 
dualistic, Wittgenstein’s thought better supports. Wittgenstein found both “general facts” of 
nature and human experience, and genealogical reconstructions of concepts, to be valuable in 
gaining perspective on language use. Without making proper place for what Wittgenstein 
describes as “general facts,” or what studyable generically or across populations by one or 
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more human science, an imbalance occurs in which we see only differences across testimonial 
faith traditions (‘religious disagreements’) and not similarities of testimonial up-take and the 
form and function of religious faith ventures. This is the counterpoint error to the “sin” of 
chauvinism in philosophy of religion, which over generalizes similarity among religions and 
neglects differences. This section further develops general facts as aetiological information, or 
A-taken evidence on the Triangulated model. I argue we find further support for the 
Triangulated model in Wittgenstein’s thought, and that philosophers of religion (whether 
religious or non-religious and whether Continental or analytic in style) should prefer it for its 
ability to distinguish philosophy of religion from religious apologetics, and to promote 
philosophy of religion as genuinely interdisciplinary research. I show how it provides a 
comfortable home for philosophers, theologians and scientists, and improves the prospects for 
the epistemology of religious belief and unbelief. 
 
2. The Significance of Aetiological Challenges 
The distinction of credence-taken evidence and belief-taken evidence allows that creeds are not 
credences, i.e., inferences from evidence. An epistemology of religious belief which treats them 
as such will misunderstand religious discourse. Distinguishing B-taken evidence from C-taken 
evidence, the dualists aim to show, has general epistemological advantages, but especially so in 
respect to the epistemology of religious belief. Wittgenstein’s own distinction between treating 
evidence criterial or symptomatic was shown to have significant overlap with the proposal of B-
C dualists, such that Wittgensteinian philosophers might find that proposal amenable.  
Yet I went on to criticize certain aspects of the application of B-C dualism to the 
epistemology of religious belief, which I found ripe for polemical apologetics and not conducive 
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to a balanced account. The human sciences which study religion have much to say about whether 
is referred to as B – reasoning by the dualists. Unchallengeable appeal to B-reasoning seems to 
allow indulgence in “uniqueness” claims at the cost of recognizing the seriousness evidence of 
patterns (aetiological symmetries) in the uptake of teachings in a testimonial faith tradition. 
Being hyper-focused on the uniqueness of the home religion’s theology, religious particularists 
ignore or deny evidence of aetiological symmetries, and analogies holding between the epistemic 
status of their own religious beliefs and those who hold contrary views. B-reasoning cannot so 
easily do away with problems of religious diversity nor can it. It highlights the internal, 
phenomenological perspective, but cannot exclude the validity of external perspectives. Our 
propensities for counter-inductive thinking help to explain how aetiological symmetry gives rise 
to polarized and polemical religious particularism in testimonial faith traditions.  
When analytic and Continental philosophers of religion engage more directly with some 
of these same concerns, we may find that they share more common ground with comparative 
philosophy of religion, and with the aims and methodologies of the human sciences which study 
religion. For as DiPaolo and Simpson (2016, 3079) explain, “Etiological Challenges encourage 
us to pay attention to notable facts about our belief-forming processes that would otherwise be 
ignored.”8 I tried to show that the shortcoming in the B-C dualist proposal overlaps and quite 
substantial ways with how Wittgenstein’s account of “theology as grammar” (criterial usage) is 
sometimes used apologetically to ignore commonalities among believers, and to support the 
isolation and insulation of religious communities.9 I developed this to show that the B-C dualist 
proposal and others that display a similar fault need to be supplemented in ways which make 
place for empirically grounded studies and the aetiological challenges which might arise from 
them. B-reasoning often incites making the home religion an unprincipled exception to the force 
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of inductive patterns and symmetries. The prevalence of B-reasoning in the uptake of religious 
teachings is descriptively true, but it would be suspect as a basis for polemical religious 
apologetics. 
The argument of this paper is not any one of these three are necessarily either supportive 
or undermining of religious belief. Rather, the argument is that methodologically these three 
ways of taking evidence always need to be taken together; that all three are pertinent to 
philosophical assessment of particular agents and the theological methods they employ, such that 
neglecting any of them impoverishes philosophy of religion. Inviting empirically-grounded and 
comparative study of religion to the table more properly balances concern with the form and 
content of religious cognition. Indeed, this model is multi-faceted rather than ‘dualistic’ in the 
sense of privileging either the uniqueness claimed for one’s religious phenomenology or the 
explanatory salience genetic/generic factors accessible to scientific study. So, the primary focus 
here is on constructing the Triangulated, or ABC’s model as a sounder basis for dialogue among 
theologians, philosophers, and researchers in the sciences which study religion. But I also try to 
motivate a non-quietist reading of Wittgenstein and the ‘battle against bewitchment by means of 
language’ which is amenable to the basic features of the proposed model.  
Triangulating the discourse thus serves to correct for potentially insulating appeal to B-
reasoning, which I interpret B-C “dualism” as allowing or even encouraging. It corrects for an 
imbalanced focus on content and religious particularism in contrast with form, and the 
importance of objective aetiological symmetries. But the Triangulated model recognizes that like 
B-reasoning and C-reasoning, what we will here term “A-reasoning” in neither inherently 
undercutting nor supportive of religious belief. Rather, these kinds of evidence, or ways of 
“taking” evidence, can each be sources of arguments which bear on the philosophical assessment 
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of epistemic states and standings. Recognition that A-reasoning is important for religious 
epistemics improves the prospects for constructive dialogue across theology, the human sciences, 
and philosophy. I will try to further substantiate this proposal in the remaining sections of this 
paper by sketching the manner in which A, B, and C-reasoning each provides perspective on the 
other two, and by indicating new questions for shared research which emerge from studying the 
three “sides” of the Triangulated model of discourse over the epistemology of religious belief. 
 
3. Checks and Balances: The Three Corners of the Triangle 
We can now fill out the Triangulated model for progress in the epistemology of religious belief 
[Tables 2 & 3, below]. The model allows a ‘comfortable home’ for philosophers, theologians, 
and researchers in the human sciences which study psychographic diversity (differences in belief 
and belief-systems), insisting, indeed, on their permanent relevance or seat at the table. Since our 
main thesis is that the triangle facilitates the more balanced discussion, it is appropriate to start 
with the corners, and with a brief statement about how each of the three forms of reasoning 
tempers the other two, and about how each complements the others. These ‘checks’ will be 
described in terms of implications for the epistemology of beliefs across domains of 
controversial views, rather than religious belief and unbelief specifically. After that will look at 
the three sides with examples of the kinds of questions which arise by focusing on each of them. 
These are suggested ways of “balancing” form and content, eventuating in questions which all 
parties can work on collaboratively and not just separately. The sides will be described with 





3.1 The Three Corners: Initial Descriptions 
Our initial description of the ABC’s of religious epistemics can perhaps best be given in a bullet-
point format: 
C-Reasoning is: 
• Associated with probabilistic and logical reasoning; “degreed” credences (or degrees of 
belief). It heightens evidentialist standards, and insists as philosophy does that reasoned 
argumentation and acquired skills of reasoning are common ground for knowledge seekers. 
• Associated with analytic philosophy, formal methods, and finer-grained, even quantitative 
reasoning from evidence according to formal principles. Tends not just towards epistemology 
but towards an epistemological internalism (or propositionally-focused ex ante approach). 
Therefore, also associated with methodological individualism and with appeal to one or 
another ideal theory. Tends to ignore or set aside human biases and psychology, along with 
most limitations of ecological rationality.   
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• Key players:  Natural theology & disproof atheism; religious or skeptical rationalism. 
Credence-first reductionism (‘beliefs are always/usually reducible to credences’) or still more 
strongly, belief-eliminativism (‘there are only credences’).  
 
B-Reasoning is: 
• Responsiveness to experiences, life choices, and praxis/ritual & community; diachronic and 
holistic assessments; relationships of trust, and values of trustfulness, hope. 
• Especially sensitive to special relationships of trust in cultural inheritances and identity with 
a testimonial tradition. Tends not just towards phenomenological or first-personal 
perspectives and valuative, but towards holistic assessment of  worldview beliefs. 
• Associated with theologies and  religious studies highlighting positive role of emotions and 
values in worldview beliefs, or in spiritual/religious identity. Tends to ignore scientific and 
philosophical reasoning, and can invite not just particularism but ideological polarization 
spirals. Shows negative sensitivity to evidential inductive norms, contingency anxiety, and 
objective riskiness of a process or strategy of inquiry.  
• Key players: Non-evidentialist Continental and Analytic theologies and apologetics; 
phenomenological, pragmatist, enactivist, social, standpoint, virtue epistemologies, etc. 




• Associated with aetiological information, and empirical studies of the human sciences. It 
heightens the relevance of similarities between people, group dynamics,  and patterns 
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apparent across persons, and across religious testimonial traditions. It tends not just towards 
supporting descriptive science, but experimental social psychology and an empirically-
informed, external-reliabilist (or agent/group ex post) approach in epistemology. Scientific 
studies involve explanatory aims, and social epistemologies (including critical genealogies) 
also draw directly from aetiological concerns.  
• Emphasis on generic functions of ideas, and patterns in religious populations which hold 
across cultures, can tend towards over-generalization, thereby ignoring or discounting group 
differences. The explanatory value of the ecological nature of human thinking, and of truth-
linked concern with safe  and sensitive beliefs processes of belief-formation, need not be 
based on over-generalization about universal and genetic factors. A-evidence helps us to 
“take perspective” and to think hypothetically; it aids us in redressing our bias blind spot, and 
many other more specific personal and group biases. 
• Key players: CSR researchers who apply  empirical psychological studies and  evolutionary 
science to study religious belief and unbelief. Individual philosophers, theologians, or others 
who utilize CSR studies or other sciences to frame arguments which support or undercut 
religious realism (‘bunking and debunking’). 
 
3.2 Checks: A Temperance Movement 
The ‘checks and balances’ built into the Triangulated model in were earlier advertised as 
ensuring an appropriate balance of “form” and “content” in philosophy of religion. To make 
good on this, we here describe the ‘checks’ as manners in which each basic way of taking 




C-Reasoning tempers B-Reasoning by: 
Establishing formal norms of argument strength and validity, and censuring fallacious 
inferences and rhetorical exchanges. Logos-centered discourse over ethos and pathos-centric 
persuasion; formal argumentation as shared common-ground even in deep disagreement. Not 
setting religious discourse apart without grounds for doing so. 
 
C-Reasoning tempers A-Reasoning by: 
Reminding us that reductionism and error theories, like realist theories, need to be argued for, 
and that people can improve their epistemic situation even in respect to culturally-conditioned or 
‘nurtured’ beliefs, by methodical reflection upon the evidence for them. 
____ 
B-Reasoning tempers C-Reasoning by:  
Showing how formal arguments and ideal theories often neglect the many forces shaping beliefs 
in domains of controversial views (morals, politics, philosophies, and theologies). Pragmatic 
encroachment is a genuine phenomenon and another normal aspect of worldview beliefs often 
neglected by those who associate all rationality with C-reasoning. 
 
B-Reasoning tempers A-Reasoning by: 
Paying attention to first-personal perspectives, and warning against ignoring cultural or 
theological differences by over-generalization about the origins or adaptive functions of 





A-Reasoning tempers B-Reasoning by:  
Encouraging us to pay attention to human-level patterns/symmetries, to our potential for bias; 
Aetiological challenges draw attention to notable facts about our belief-forming processes that 
would otherwise be ignored. (DePaolo and Simpson). 
 
A-Reasoning tempers C-Reasoning by: 
 Showing the importance to epistemological assessment and guidance of ecological rationality, 
empirical studies of human behavior including bias studies, and non-ideal theory. 
Psychographic contrariety not studied well as propositionally-based “disagreement.” 
 
3.3 Balances: Shares Issues in the Scholarly Study of Religious Belief/Unbelief 
 The sides of the Triangulated model are understood as intersections where some of the most 
fruitful interdisciplinary and collaborative research across philosophy, religious studies 
(scientific or scientifically informed), and theology might occur [Table 3, below]. For while 
properly-tempered A, B, and C-reasoning contribute to fruitful discourse across disciplinary 
divides, each of the three tends to become extremely one-sided when not tempered in this way. 
A real improvement of discourse might occur when the applications of each of the three for 
philosophy of religion are properly qualified. This also promotes interdisciplinary cooperation. 
We will accordingly amplify complementary issues and shared concerns which arise from 
elaborating A, B, and C-reasoning, issues and concerns which too often are considered only 











C/B   Intersections A/B Intersections A/C Intersections 
Table 3: The Three Sides as Multi-disciplinary Philosophy of Religion 
 
3.3.1 Theology & the B/C Relationship 
 The sources of diversity, especially but not exclusively found in our controversial views, 
are many. They include symbolic aspects of cultural identity, religious ambiguity, and 
confirmation holism. The holistic nature of evidence for worldviews and ideologies is correctly 
recognized as a source of diversity, as is the balance a person must choose between intellectual 
courage and caution, believing truly versus not believing falsehoods. 
C-reasoning often appears blind to B-reasons. As ideal theory, C-Reasoning tries to wall 
off logic and epistemology from psychology. It takes an ex ante approach to epistemic 
assessment, where characteristics of particular agents or groups are largely set aside. It appears to 
reside in synchronic (time-slice) relations between a body of evidence and a target proposition, 
or decision; agents enter only tokens of ideal types. The main normative concern is with 
reasoners a meeting or maximizing norms of epistemic rationality. As with the Triad model 
reducing epistemic attitudes to belief, disbelief, or suspension (Feldman and Conee, 2004), 
degree-of-credence talk excludes recognition of all manner of trait-dependent factors which as 
sources of cognitive diversity. C-Reasoning posits instead a generic subject, a target proposition, 
and an information-set bearing on that proposition. C-reasoning often forgets that are most 
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closely held beliefs are often culturally inherited, and that we find ourselves in embedded in a 
natural and social world.  
So, the recognition of B-reasoning and A-reasoning as different than C-reasoning tempers 
philosophy’s reliance upon ideal theory, allowing for embodiment and ecological rationality. 
This arguably enables philosophers of religion to take the ‘agential turn’ as well as the 
‘externalist turn’ in epistemology, and to say that philosophers of religion cannot be blind to 
these factors. B-reasoning and A-reasoning both look to actual agents (individual or collective) 
and to the appropriateness of their strategies of inquiry for the problems they are employing them 
for. The focus of philosophical assessment is agents themselves and their epistemic processes, 
methods or strategies, so neither B-Reasoning nor A-Reasoning is given to ideal theory. Many 
writers concerned with sources of contrariety in domains of controversial views, including 
religion, many have focused on a particular factor. Kidd (2013) for example follows James in 
focusing heavily on individual temperament as a key source of reasonable disagreement. This 
includes connections between risk-taking and identity construction. John Hick and Robert 
McKim focus much more on the religiously ambiguous nature of evidence regarding theistic 
belief and unbelief.10 B-reasoning and ‘B-evidence’ as presented by the B-C dualists seems to be 
a hodge-podge of such factors, but this is by no means inappropriate: it fits the subject matter and 
domain. This is why they identify B-reasoning with holistic evaluations, lacking the algorithmic 
character of credences and disagreement among credences. Pragmatic reasons for belief, when 
they are recognized, are another source of cognitive diversity. 
Religion and theology have a rocky history with C-reasoning, which is often associated 
with philosophy. Where they converge one finds the natural theologians, and the traditional 
Catholic idea of faith and reason as alternative, often complementary ways to religious truth. But 
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there is arguably a fideistic minimum in religious faith, and as this grows stronger one finds 
more discord between C-reasoning and B-reasoning, and strategies either of rejecting C-
reasoning or appropriating it in the service of preestablished belief. These are of course risky 
strategies, but epistemically assent is to some degree ‘baked into’ even a generic conception of 
faith. B-evidence bearing upon religious language and practice contributes to the C-evidence that 
an agent has or has available. But taking special experiences and testimonial transmissions as 
evidence greatly complicates the hope for any impartial, evidentialist or probabilistic assessment 
of C-evidence bearing on epistemological dimensions of religious language. Taking the moral 
and pragmatic fruits of a faith-commitment as evidence does so as well. These allow for a kind 
of ‘testing,’ perhaps, but one that is more characteristic of personal experimentation and 
satisfaction than of logical inference to the best explanation. 
B-reasoning tends to be weighed more heavily by agents than C-evidence in domains of 
controversial views. The holistic evaluation of evidence makes C-evidence less compelling and 
personal experiences and special relationships of trust more so. While proponents of C-reasoning 
will say that it is able to countenance diverse forms of evidence, B-reasoning is typically more 
holistic, and resists formalization. C-reasoning can allow for rational reconstructions of beliefs in 
domains of controversial views. But rarely is C-reasoning alone the actual basis for belief in 
these domains.  
Worldview beliefs and faith ventures typically involve dependence upon affective B-
reasoning, as is evident from the fact that C-reasoning would enjoin us to take earlier and later-
acquired evidence with the same weight. Instead, human psychology shows that our earliest 
experiences and beliefs are usually weighted much more highly by people, and C-reasoning is 
often an exercise in post-hoc defense of cultured beliefs. B-reasoning and what psychologists call 
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motivated reasoning are thus difficult to distinguish. Thus, there is great need of critical 
principles to assess B-reasoning. It may be naïve to think that clear critical principles are on 
offer. Nevertheless, theory virtues may be sought which satisfy philosophical, theological, and 
empirical adequacy together.  
 
3.3.2 Cognitive Science and the A/B Relationship 
More so than either of the other two dimensions, the A-B dimension allows us to balance form 
and content in the study of religion. Together, the A-B dimension helps us to recognize and gain 
understanding of the contributing factors, personal and cultural, to the spread of religious ideas. 
B-reasoning and A-reasoning both provide insights on the sources of religious multiplicity, and 
of the trait-dependent factors that overdetermine belief in the religious domain, and in domains 
of controversial views more generally. 
Yet they tend to pull in opposite directions: A-evidence notes formal similarities and 
naturalistic proximate causes of religious cognition, while B evidence is often used to support 
uniqueness and truth of a special revelation or transmission of knowledge in a testimonial faith 
tradition. Thus, A-reasoning often takes people’s B-reasoning as an object of study. If the 
content of faith-based assent, thought of propositionally, is logically underdetermined by agent-
neutral evidence and argument, what factor of factors overdetermine an individual’s assent?  
Attribution theory in psychology allows access to new ways of studying the psychology 
of belief and unbelief. It is one of the areas in which psychologists and theologians might 
beneficially work together. Attribution theory is not more ‘debunking’ than other psychological 
studies, but it recognizes the attributional activities of agents as an important focus of research 
both in the human sciences and in theologies. Anne Taves writes, “The attribution process is 
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motivated by (1) a need or desire to perceive events in the world as meaningful, (2) a need or 
desire to predict or control events, and (3) a need or desire to protect, maintain, and enhance 
one’s self-concept and self-esteem.” Attribution theories applied to religious cognition put focus 
on the processes by which people of religious orientation make causal and characterological 
attributions. How agents attribute character-traits and markers of religious value or disvalue to 
others is thus a prime area for social-psychological research.  
Across domains of controversial views, beliefs are logically underdetermined by 
evidence; and this suggests that to lesser or greater degree they are at the same time causally 
overdetermined by social and trait – dependent factors. The overdetermination of religious 
choices or actions by numerous evolutionary, affective, and social causes is arguably just the flip 
side of the problem of the underdetermination of faith-based belief by evidence. Under and 
overdetermination are paired theses. The trait-dependence of the doxastic attitude which an 
agent holds towards a proposition is not necessarily indicative of strong bias. This needs to be 
shown, and argued for in a particular case.  
These and other studies bearing on human biases and heuristics are quite directly 
concerned with the aetiology of belief. A-reasoning may lead us to see biases as or present in 
some domains of controversial views and less in others. A-type reasons are available to rebut 
claims on behalf of B-type reasons when aetiological challenges are mountable on their basis.11 
Well-founded aetiological challenges to ill-founded beliefs are one’s based upon objective 
markers, including one’s reliance upon counter-inductive reasoning (violation of inductive 
norms), and the “mirroring” of known personal or group biases.12  
Still, the Triangulated model supports what Justin Barrett terms “a stance of explanatory 
non-exclusivity” on the part of CSR researchers and others studying religion (2007, 769).13 This 
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is primarily a methodological stance and does not preclude the study of particular hypotheses, 
nor the development of broader theories which may weigh in on matters of religious and 
naturalistic metaphysics and epistemology. It establishes formal conditions for well-motivated 
aetiological challenges, but such challenges when properly qualified target particular agents or 
groups, and their bearing on religious and theological belief more generally is quite indirect. On 
the other hand, A-reasoning militates against the equally over-generalized claim that naturalistic 
explanations (NERBS) can never raise serious new challenges to supernaturally or theologically-
cast explanations. Explanation and evidence seem to be mutually-implying concepts: an 
unevidenced explanation is hardly an explanation at all. So, putting A-reasoning and B-reasoning 
into conversation promises to lead to better understanding of the explanatory ambitions of 
theologies.  
 
 3.3.3 Philosophy and the A/C Relationship 
Philosophy is closely associated with C-reasoning, since the tools-or-trade in philosophy and in 
philosophical theology are arguments. A-reasoning by contrast starts from empirically informed 
study of the origins and aetiology of belief. It concerns especially what inductive evidence there 
is for etiological symmetries and asymmetries across human populations.  A-reasoning’s focus is 
firstly descriptive, and also allows for seeking well-supported explanations, taking that term 
broadly. Human sciences which study religion study its proximate causes and many functions in 
human lives. CSR studies the aetiology of belief more explicitly than the other special sciences, 
and much of this research program is at the level of evolutionary selection and transmission of 
religious ideas.  Methodological agnosticism calls for many CSR researchers as it does for other 
sciences which study religion. The evolutionary selection of religious ideas is clearly intertwined 
22 
 
with the evolution of group cooperation, and the data of CSR which researchers collect retains a 
neutrality: neither directly bunks nor debunks religious ideas. Arguments for supernaturalism or 
naturalism, realism or fictionalism, etc., might be based upon performed psychological studies, 
but these are interpretations (explanatory arguments him) which need to be argued for.  
The hypotheses which researchers in CSR investigate often provoke reflection and 
challenge assumptions about religious ideas held by the most skeptical and most credulous. CSR 
is not all about distant evolutionary perspectives; many factors benefitting the growth of 
religious ideas are social-cognitive. A-reasoning as the study of the aetiology of belief includes 
the uptake of belief in testimonial faith traditions, and difference in religious orientation, 
fundamentalist orientation, which psychologists attempt to make comparatively valid. It studies 
religious education, and whether and how religious contrariety in testimonial faith traditions is 
likely to arise on the basis of aetiologically symmetrical processes (modes or strategies of belief-
uptake).  
A-reasoning is driven by the force of patterns, and inductive norms. Methodologically, 
neither theologians nor philosophers nor scientists should exempt the domain of religion from 
influenced by general personal and social biases. Methodologically, this would be to discount 
any substantial force to A-evidence from the outset. Morally, epistemologically, and 
metaphysically this is an expression of a kind of absolutism, and by such an assumption people 
dis-enable themselves from recognizing social dynamics including belief polarization, and 
related issues of doxastic responsibility including hermeneutic and testimonial injustice. 
Part of what doxastic state pluralists would need to consider if they allow for aetiological 
challenges based upon scientific findings at the broadly human level, is when it may stop making 
philosophical sense to attribute belief to an agent, in contrast to some other pro-attitude. For 
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example, Neil van Leeuwen’s article “Do Religious ‘Beliefs’ Respond to Evidence?” (2017) and 
“Religious Credence is not Factual Belief” (2014) argue that “psychology and epistemology 
should posit distinct cognitive attitudes of religious credence and factual belief, which have 
different etiologies and different cognitive and behavioral effects”:  “[F]actual beliefs (i) are 
practical setting independent, (ii) cognitively govern other attitudes, and (iii) are evidentially 
vulnerable. By way of contrast, religious credences (a) have perceived normative orientation, (b) 
are susceptible to free elaboration, and (c) are vulnerable to special authority.”14 As Leeuwen 
points out, illusory self-attributions of belief, which are certainly possible, are harder to 
investigate when philosophy and cognitive science both tend to assume that belief “is a single 
cognitive attitude type and that variation in behavioral effects of different beliefs is due to 
variation in contents” (706).  
So Leeuwen’s A-reasoning approach in defense of doxastic state pluralism is both similar 
to and yet widely divergent from Buchak and Jackson’s.15 While Leeuwen and the B-C dualists 
agree we need to reject reductionism and eliminative views to embrace a sort of doxastic state 
pluralism,16 their differences invite discussion: A-reasoners and B-reasoners can learn from one 
another while studying much the same subject matter.17 Philosophers of religion need to 
carefully study such differences, and the Triangle would invite them to, rather than assuming the 
one of the other holds the only plausible approach to these doxastic states or attitudes.18 
A-reasoning is naturally connected with the study of human cognition. We describe it not 
as an attitude-type, but as a mode of acquiring and processing evidence or certain sorts. This 
process of A-reasoning is quintessentially inductive: study of the aetiology of belief, of safety, 
etc., can go only so far with philosophical or imaginative thought experiments. To ground in it 
must be evidenced through inductive patterns apparent or discoverable in pertinent evidence. 
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Since inductive reasoning is broken down in textbooks into cause-effect reasoning, 
generalization, and analogical reasoning, it may behoove us to consider what A-reasoning 
indicates with respect to each of these three.  
Of course, A-reasoning inherits some of the same faults and limitations of inductive 
inferences.19 But without A-reasoning we could not have Anthropology and related “human” 
sciences. Psychologists who study human ideas and ideologies, and phenomena like belief 
polarization are concerned not just with aetiological symmetries and asymmetries across human 
populations, but also with people’s (folk) attributions: with how they employ generalizations and 
analogies/disanalogies, when attributing character traits (virtues/vices, bias) and moral and 
epistemic goods (religious value, truth, knowledge, rationality) to themselves in contrast to group 
outsiders.   
A-reasoning is not necessarily indicative of the evolutionary debunking of religious or 
supernatural beliefs, though that is one connection. But theists make arguments from evolution, 
CSR, and genealogy to support rather than undercut their beliefs. So, there is no need to take A-
reasons as wholly skeptical by nature, any more than to take B-reasons as always and only 
supporting belief. But one natural connection for A-reasons, if they are allowed their natural 
function of sometimes serious etiological challenges, is to what Sean Larson (2020) and other 
contributors to a recent symposium on the current state of theology, term reckoning: 
“Theological reckoning highlights and sometimes accounts for what has gone wrong in 
theological traditions. It can be a critical moment in a larger process of refinement or application, 
or it can be done on its own, as a way of calling theological discourses to account for harmful 
assumptions or effects.”20 
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In summary, as shown in our final Table [Table 4 below], these foregoing elaborations of 
the sides of the Triangulated model were aimed to show how theologians, philosophers, and 
researchers across the human sciences are each provided an independent but respected base in 
philosophy of religion as multi-disciplinary research. Each has a kind of, if not teaching 
‘magisteria,’ then a “safe base” in a game-like structure. Not only the reasons why each should 
respect the other’s reserved seat as the (not-so-round) table, but their disciplinary intersections 
may raise research questions that invite and even necessitate interdisciplinary research to inquire 
into, or to satisfactorily answer. This is how a multi-disciplinary discourse would be not only be 
most fairly structured, but also promotive of interdisciplinary research and collegial interactions. 
By highlighting the vibrancy of the three sides qua interdisciplinary intersections, the extreme or 
reductive forms of A, B, and C-reasoning can be better be recognized as the roadblocks to 





4. Wittgenstein and Philosophical Investigations of Religious Belief 
We have now given enough substance to the Triangulated model that readers can see whether 
they agree that it promotes balanced approaches in philosophy of religion. But what reasons are 
there for thinking that Wittgenstein’s philosophical methods would support the triangulated 
model, and lead him to prefer it over the B-C dualist proposal? Part of the question here is just 
whether Wittgenstein would be amenable to much of the work in contemporary cognitive science 
of religion, and I will argue that he would. But I will also give further attention on connections 
between risky beliefs and the suspension or violation of inductive norms. 
Wittgenstein would have been familiar with David Hume’s and William James’ ideas for 
a science of religion, but his reflections on faith and empirical reason remain focused on 
language, language communities, and the word/world relationships they exhibit. They remain 
focused not just on use within the community, but on tensions between language – using 
communities, and between grammatical and symptomatic (inductive norm-employing) language. 
Wittgenstein was quite familiar with Soren Kierkegaard as well, and many of his reflections on 
faith focus not just on tensions but even instances of apparent paradox. But only some of these 
reflections bear upon his Christian understanding of faith specifically. Wittgenstein’s account of 
faith apparently left him critical of the value of natural theology and of atheistical argumentation 
as well. It is not just O’Hara’s evidentialism about Biblical teachings which he was critical of, 
but likely systematic theology.  
These tendencies in his thought might initially be thought to lead him to prefer B-C 
dualism over the Triangulated model, since our model gives greater place to interdisciplinary 
debate and dialogue, whereas Wittgenstein is often characterized by the idea of minimizing 
conflict by making a “different place” for those beliefs, whether general like monotheism, or 
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religion-specific. But the conflation is as apparent on the literal-historical side as on the skeptical 
side. The Triangulated model I contend it better able to resist the reduction of complex religious 
contrariety to contradictory propositions.21 So we started by saying it is odd that there are 
potentially important similarities between analytic Christian philosophy and Continental thought 
influenced by Wittgenstein, which the analytic/Continental divide in styles might lead us to miss. 
But now I want to say that there are further reasons for philosophers of religion --hyphenated or 
not -- to understand these commonalities in a way which invites the checks and balances of the 
Triangulated model.  
Even if they may find fault in both the Triangulated model and B-C dualism, 
Wittgensteinian philosophers of religion I want to argue should be more inclined to the former, 
and then suggest amendments from there. The application of B-C dualism to the epistemology of 
religious belief still strikes me as an apologetic strategy utilizing analytic philosophical methods. 
I suggest that if Wittgenstein thought of O’Hara’s evidentialist apologetics as doing more harm 
than good to Christian faith, he might think the same about many contemporary apologetic 
strategies, internalist and externalist, which aim to defend religion-specific knowledge. This is of 
course speculation, but it was at any rate during my reading of Wittgenstein’s reflections on 
religious language that a Triangulated model came to mind. So, while I may struggle to explain 
why I think he would prefer it over B-C dualism, and the question at least invites discussion. A 
good deal of CSR research involves religious ideas and language use, and I suspect that 
Wittgenstein would find research in this field fascinating and relevant to his own thinking, so 
long as this research is not one-sidedly partisan to either religious or skeptical rationalism.  
Reflection on our language practices involves its aetiology and its functions, and this is 
A-taken evidence in a fairly direct sense. When we consider Wittgenstein’s key distinction 
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between treating evidence as symptomatic or as criterial, we should see it not merely as a logical 
partition. We should see it as opening up A-reasoning as pertinent to understanding religious 
ideas, and as fitting its object of study (even while he took C-reasoning as an ill-fitting way to 
treat religious ideas).  
Moreover, the Triangulated model opens up a range of concerns about evidentially 
grounded or ungrounded belief, truth, and meaning, rather than shutting down comparison by 
suggesting isolated language games, or ‘quietist’ philosophy of religion. Some of his 
contemporaries held Wittgenstein’s account to be quietist, and Russell’s harsh statements about 
his later philosophy respond almost in kind to the “infinite harm” comment attributed to 
Wittgenstein. But Thomas Carroll, Cora Diamond,  and Gorazd Andrejč are among those who 
provide reasons to hold that Wittgenstein should not be read as assuming or defending either the 
idea of science and religion as hermeneutically sealed-off.  
Carroll (2014, 148) argues that “while ‘language-game’ [Sprachspiel] and ‘form of life’ 
[Lebensform] are certainly important expressions in Wittgenstein’s philosophy, they have taken 
on a life of their own beyond Wittgenstein’s corpus.” Philosophers of religion should not read 
Wittgenstein as isolating religious language from public reason. Instead, “Wittgensteinian 
philosophy of religion could question temptations to protect religious phenomena from 
criticism.” If linguistic practices were self-contained in a sense making them immune from 
criticism or revision, then rules once admitted would never admit revisitation. For in that case 
there could be no recognition of means (symptoms) to discover it, and expectations alone would  
determine what is allowed to be examined.  
Wittgenstein held there to be enough objectivity to the study of language-use to 
sometimes show errors, idiosyncrasies, self-contradictions, unacknowledged paradoxes, and self-
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deceptions. Inductive normativity, while foreign to Wittgensteinian fideism, was never 
something he simply banished from religious thinking or from philosophical study of the 
grammar of assent. Instead it is part of a dialectic, where insider and outsider may each gain 
perspective on religious reasons or grounds. So, Wittgenstein in his Lectures on Religious Belief 
toggles back and forth from inductive norm-violating assent, to how things look to one who is 
not committed to the faith-based commitments of the other.  
There are also passages where, far from being quietist, Wittgenstein suggests a project of 
comprehensive or at least wider understanding, and a ‘battle against bewitchment’  that spans 
some of the differences between scientific and religious thinking.  In a seminal note (OC §438), 
Wittgenstein writes that, “Nothing is commoner than for the meaning of an expression to 
oscillate, for a phenomenon to be regarded sometimes as a symptom, sometimes as a criterion, of 
a state of affairs. And mostly in such a case the shift of meaning is not noted.” Philosophy plays 
a definite role in noticing, drawing attention to, and extending our understanding of such tensions 
and shifts. 
These two “antithetical terms” (“criterial” and “symptom”) (Zettel, p. 25) must be 
allowed to function mutual comparison and contrast: The complete dominance of one would just 
be blindness to the other. Not to recognize tensions and shifts is to be involved in self-deception, 
meaning that one’s epistemic circumstance and resources could be improved. Again, in PI §142, 
in a passage Lycan (1971) takes as especially important, Wittgenstein writes that “if rule became 
exception and exception rule; or if both became ... phenomena of roughly equal frequency, this 
would make our normal language-games lose their point.” (Philosophical Investigations). They 
will miss the “impropriety” of their speech. Thus, A-B and A-C relations on the Triangulated 
model fits well with some of the characteristics which Lycan points out in Wittgenstein’s 
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contrast: “The difference is between ‘what we have (experimentally) found to be evidence for Y’ 
(symptom) and ‘what we have (in ostensive definition) learned to call evidence for Y’ 
(criterion).”22  
A radical kind of meaning holism is suggested by the claim that we accept or learn not 
just atomistic facts or propositions, but Wittgenstein’s use of “language game” immediately 
suggests a that it is a “whole system” (OC §141) or “nest of propositions” (§225) one comes to 
accept, even though it be acquired bit-by-bit (§144). But such an interpretation of Wittgenstein as 
radical meaning holist or as language games as isolated and beyond criticism would be unsound. 
His position has strong elements of coherentism in contrast to empiricist and rationalist 
foundationalism, but he often seems to be suggesting something much more like the core-belt-
auxiliary structure that Lakatos would later develop. For he often uses a different, and I think 
more apt metaphor than “hinge, “grammar,” or “game”:  “The river-bed of thoughts may shift.... 
[W]hat men consider reasonable or unreasonable alters. At certain periods men find reasonable 
what at other periods they found unreasonable. And vice versa ... (OC §97, §324). A riverbed is 
far more stable and unyielding than movement of waters on that bed. Yet this Wittgenstein 
metaphor of river waters and riverbed, while it does take bedrock assumptions to be held fast 
only in the criteria way, allows and points out that a riverbed does tend to shift over time.23  
For Wittgenstein, the study of language and conceptual “idealizations” is illuminating 
because notions of meaning and truth can surround the workings of language “with a haze which 
makes clear vision impossible” (PI I, §5-6). Genealogical methods along with other methods for 
studying language and its application are needed to disperse the fog.24 Queloz (2021) argues 
explicitly that in the context of domains of controversial views, “genealogy is one form that 
Wittgensteinian übersichtliche Darstellung may take. This allows the method to offer us 
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explanation without reduction and to help us understand what led our ideas to shed the traces of 
their practical origins.”25 Translated variously as clear vision or surveyable representation, 
übersichtliche Darstellung is associated with a kind of map-making which allows us to see and 
represent linguistic and conceptual “connections.” 
Far from being normatively inert, what Queloz terms “pragmatic genealogy” can affect 
the space of reasons, guiding attempts to improve our conceptual repertoire by helping us 
determine whether and when our ideas are worth having.”26 They yield “a holistic understanding 
of concepts as pragmatically situated by relating them to contingent facts about concept-users 
and their circumstances. It thereby exploits the Wittgensteinian insight that careful scrutiny of a 
concept alone is not going to tell us everything worth knowing about it, and that we must look 
beyond the concept to the contingent facts that explain its formation and give it its point. As 
Wittgenstein puts it, ‘a natural foundation for the way [a] concept is formed is the complex 
nature and the variety of human contingencies” (Zettel, §439; Queloz, 29).  
Wittgenstein found philosophical activity to engage “the correspondence between 
concepts and very general facts of nature. (Such facts as mostly do not strike us because of their 
generality.) But our interest is not thereby thrown back on to these possible causes of concept 
formation; we are not doing natural science; nor yet natural history—since we can also invent 
fictitious natural history for our purposes. (PI II, §365).27 These “very general facts of nature” or 
“of daily experience” are clearly of importance to Wittgenstein’s approach. “What we have to 
mention in order to explain the significance, I mean the importance, of a concept, are often 
extremely general facts of nature: such facts as are hardly ever mentioned because of their great 
generality” (PI II, §142). Wittgenstein’s repeated emphasis on the value of the general as a 
balance to particularity or difference, and as a means of gaining perspective on language and 
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language use, I conclude, clearly makes his approach more amenable to the Triangulated model 
than to any approach which still tends to dismiss such general facts. This I have argued is a key 
flaw both of the B-C dualist’s proposal, and of many other research programs which aim to 
address the epistemology of religious belief and unbelief. 
 
5. Conclusion: Affirming Philosophy of Religion as Multi-Disciplinary Research  
Our main issue has not just been to describe the different characteristics of A, B and C reasoning, 
but also to argue for the advantages of philosophy of religion as multi-disciplinary research. The 
ABC’s model of epistemics is a model which holds across domains of controversial views. But it 
has especial import, we have argued, to philosophy of religion. Each of the three types of 
reasoning has enough legitimate connection with philosophy of religion that its ‘champions’ 
ought to be granted a reserved seat at the table. The ABC’s of religious epistemics creates a safe 
base for religious phenomenological and theological studies, while also making it easier to 
distinguish religious apologetics from religious and secular philosophy of religion. 
On the Triangle, for example, we are better able to discuss what weight should be accorded to 
arguments from experience, or from testimonial trust. Similarly, the weight to be accorded to 
explanations of religious cognition stemming from human science such as biological, 
psychological and sociological, is best-debated only after recognition of It can come only after  
acknowledging the need to balance these, in order to avoid the ‘sins’ of one-sided philosophies 
and theologies, and “sins committed through the misuse of metaphorical expression” in one 
domain or another, from math to metaphysics.28  
When aetiological similarities or “patterns” are either overgeneralized or ignored, they lead to 
‘sins’ such as cultural chauvinism in the study of religion. But when based on strong evidence, 
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symmetry-of-generation and genealogical reconstructions of concept and their use aid us in 
redressing various ‘sins’ of which comparative philosophy is often accused. Indeed, A-
reasoning’s relevance is a methodological norm, an assumption in place unless we have a 
philosophically satisfactory account for why one group, one language game, way of life, domain 
etc.  is exempt from its reach. 
The Triangulated model preserves what is correct in the B-C dualist’s rejection of a narrow 
religious or skeptical evidentialism, but goes beyond it in order to improve the prospects for 
constructive dialogue across theology, the human sciences, and philosophy. It does so by 
sustaining a view of philosophy of religion as comparative and inter-disciplinary inquiry, which 
allows it to be adequately differentiated from religious apologetics. It does so by allowing that 
trait-dependent B-reasoning, including risky counter-inductive strategies of problem-solving, 
may sometimes be a direct object of psychological study in respect to religious ideas, just as it 
can be in other domains of controversial views.29 It does so by allowing that while this 
aetiological information gives us insights on our belief forming habits, and on our reliability 
which we may not otherwise give serious consideration, this information basically remains 
neutral to the theological, a theological, or other arguments which it may be appealed to as 
support. So, the force of such studies cannot be forgot by theologians any more than the validity 
of phenomenological studies and ethnographies can be forgot by experimental social 
psychologists, or human psychological needs can be forgot on the ideal theories of evidentialist 
philosophers.  
That C-reasoning may be said to ‘take account’ of B and A reasoning does not mean they are 
reducible to C-reasoning. ‘You can always just add another premise,’ one might say. All reasons 
may be said to funnel into C-evidence, even if they source in people’s personal or communal 
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experiences, or in their recognition of “peer disagreement” (Feldman). This is because higher 
order evidence is still evidence, as the internalist likes to say. But the point of the Triangle is that 
there are proponents of A-reasoning and B-reasoning who take theirs are encompassing all. The 
relationship to the ‘space of reasons’ is different than it is for C-reasoning. It is philosophically 
troubling if we cannot balance these ways of “taking” evidence or offering an explanatory 
understanding, but rather once again reduce the other two to one’s preferred way. The Triangle 
thus suggest that give each its space  – give it a default independence from the other two. 
The main goal in the paper has thus been methodological: B-reasoning’s significance to 
normative philosophical projects (including both epistemic assessment and the ethics of belief) 
should be recognized, as B-C dualists insist; but that recognition should come in a manner which 
is able at the same time to correct for the pronounced tendency of the religious to treat their own 
B-reasoning as uniquely truth and knowledge-conveying, while at the same time neglecting 
perspective that can be gained on these self or group exceptions from comparative philosophical 
methods, pan-human bias studies, psychology of religion, and CSR research.   
Wittgenstein’s prescriptive definition of philosophy as a “battle against bewitchment of 
intelligence by means of language” (PI §109) is ill-fought if religious language is not critically 
investigated by religious philosophers due to their own testimonial tradition’s authority being 
treated as absolutely unique in its epistemizing qualities. A-evidence and comparative 
philosophy of religious language, being firmly rooted in inductive normativity, remain 
epistemically significant by establishing a higher bar for progress in the struggle against 
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1 See Axtell 2021a and papers by Buchak (2014; 2017a; 2017b) and Jackson (2019; 2020). 
CSR researchers have employed the hypothesis that “minimally counter-intuitive ideas” are 
psychologically appealing and often successfully transmitted, and in the concluding chapter of 
Problems of Religious Luck (2019; PRL) I developed a proposal for an empirical research 
program at the intersections of the appeal of counter-intuitive ideas, and the human penchant 
for inductively risky (counter-inductive) thinking in regard especially to inherited beliefs and 
worldview beliefs.  
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2 Aetiological symmetries are proximate and naturalistically salient factors in belief formation or 
in strategies of inquiry, such as early childhood education, identity formation, and uptake of 
testimony or other sources of belief. Here again, the concept of A-reasoning like that of B and 
C-reasoning, is domain general, hold across everyday beliefs, but also across domains of 
controversial views. So, the Triangulated model developed here is as important for 
understanding the sources political, moral, and broadly philosophical contrariety and for the 
“epistemics” of these domains, as for religious contrariety, and religious epistemics. The 
Triangulated model is neutral in all these respects, but what is not neutral would be to exempt 
one of these domains without a philosophically satisfying account of this exception. 
 
3 Kitcher’s (2015) Terri Lectures discuss what he terms a symmetry - of - generation thesis in 
respect to belief-uptake in testimonial faith traditions. Aetiological symmetry holds wherever 
the proximate grounds behind beliefs are of the same general type. I develop how theological 
contrariety arises on the basis of aetiologically symmetrical processes in testimonial faith 
traditions, and use this to help explain the prevalence of exclusivist attitudes in the Abrahamic 
religions. This has bearing on how one can move from de jure aetiological challenges to 
potentially stronger de facto challenges (see Axtell 2019, Chapter 6).  
 
4 Marbaniang 2010 np, quoting Goldman1978, 509. Marbaniang continues, “As such, it 
would be appropriate to use the term ‘epistemics of religious fundamentalism’ to refer to that 
branch of philosophical enquiry that deals with active beliefs that fundamentalists hold to be 
justified and true, and that subjectively and/or intrasocially (within a particular community) 
appear to justify fundamentalist behaviors.” So individual epistemology, social/collective 
epistemology, human psychology and the sciences which study religion are all acknowledged 
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by the term religious epistemics, as understood here. Religious and non-religious perspectives 
are both acknowledged.  
5 There may also be overlap with “epistemology of theology” as Abraham and Aquino use 
that term, since they explicitly say in their Handbook of Epistemology of Theology (2018, 1) 
that “no uniform epistemological or theological approaches are synonymous with the 
epistemology of theology,” and also acknowledge the relevance of “generic considerations that 
cut across subject matter (e.g. perception; memory; and inference).” However, while it 
encourages fruitful traffic across theology and philosophy, that particular collection seems 
heavily given to Christian theological thought and this may skew some of its treatment of 
“history,” when the more generic term affording an adequately comparative approach might be 
“sacred narrative” or “scriptural narrative.”  “Epistemology of theologies” would be better, 
being a philosophical counterpart to a theology of religions, while also counterpoint to 
relativist-cum-absolutist sounding “Christian epistemology,” “Islamic epistemology,” etc., or 
the still uglier “religious epistemology of religious belief.” I am supportive rather than critical 
of “hyphenated” philosophers and philosophies [See also Axtell 2021a and b] . But these latter 
terms and others like them threaten to take “epistemology” and “philosophy” honorifically, 
where they are essentially just euphemistic for apologetics, as most everyone would concede 
that “Christian science” and “creation science” are.  
 
6 What counts as a disagreement is itself a contested question, and re-describing this contrariety 
with the negatively-valued term “disagreement” is, oddly enough, characteristic of what 
evidentialism and religious enthusiasm have in common. See Axtell 2021 for fuller development.   
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7 “Let us introduce two antithetical terms in order to avoid certain elementary confusions: To the 
question ‘How do you know that so-and-so is the case?’, we sometimes answer by giving 
'criteria' and sometimes by giving 'symptoms'.” (Zettel p. 25 in  CWW). I will often utilize the 
electronic Collected Works (CWW) for reference coordination, and fullest citations are 
available there. But compare other translations. 
8 See also A. Mogensen (2017), to whom (with apologies) I elsewhere incorrectly attributed 
this quote. 
9 My critique of the B-C dualists extends recent work explaining and responding to the 
attempt of post-liberals, including “Right-Wittgensteinians,” to justify and ‘normalize’ 
polarized and polemical religious apologetics. This is something I argue philosophers and 
theologians should strongly oppose. Leaving everything as it is may be true of descriptive or 
explanatory science, but not of philosophy. Philosophy performs normative and critical 
functions, and philosophers and theologians both utilize various sorts of evidence in making 
arguments. But I fully grant that combating fundamentalism and instilling an evidentialist 
account are two quite different things. I only contend that the permissivism which Jackson 
utilizes B-C dualism to support needs to be cast in a risk-aware, and risk-limited form, and that 
recognition of the potential seriousness of aetiological challenges is necessary for this. The 
Triangulated model facilitates a re-balancing of form and content such that each can be given 
its due in conversations between when theologians, philosophers, and religious studies scholars. 
10 Ambiguity makes it difficult to adjudicate between what James would call “the religious 
hypothesis” and the “naturalistic hypothesis.” While these reconstructions are rationalistic, we 
can still view the bringing of them into C-reasoning is a very positive event, and certainly 
James does not mean that faith is being construed as hypothesis. It just makes ground for 
44 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
philosophers and theologians to develop research programs, and to recognize when they are 
“live” and going projects or degenerative ones. But James would say that the various, more 
specific religious “overbeliefs” a person holds have plural, temperamentally overdetermined 
sources; they do not stem from the hard core, but just need to be maintained as consistent with 
it. Our philosophical and religious overbeliefs help us “build out” the core idea we assent to 
into a fuller worldview, and into praxis. Logical underdetermination often leads to C-reasoning 
being displaced in favor of B-reasoning. Robert McKim’s distinction between simple, rich, and 
extremely rich evidential ambiguity is relevant to this, since it shows when and where B-
reasoning is utilized more than C-reasoning.  
11 Evidence of aetiological symmetries and of bias-mirroring use of B-reasoning contributes 
to aetiological challenges which undercut certain claims. A-type reasons are most forceful 
when religious agents engage in a) rhetorical as opposed to robust vice charging, b) radically 
asymmetrical trait-ascriptions to group insiders and outsiders, c) the mirroring of known social 
biases, or d) other measurable aspects of counter-inductive thinking. 
12 Ill-founded belief is challenged from the side of cognitive and social psychology by 
established markers of cognitive or moral dissonance, indoctrination anxiety, confabulatory 
explanation, or personal or social bias more generally. Thus, aetiological symmetry as a sober 
conclusion from evidence bumps up against the explanatory asymmetries of religious 
enthusiasts, or fundamentalists. This tension should make the attributional activities of the latter 
group a keener interest for researchers, or so I propose in PRL, Chapter 6. 
13 See also Biabanaki (2020) for an argument supporting  Barrett’s claim. CSR researchers 
differ somewhat on these issues, but most abide by the general idea that scientific studies are 
neutral to metaphysical debates, or at least that methodological neutrality demands a certain 
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separation of conclusions. There is a broader issue of explanatory monism vs pluralism that goes 
far beyond concerns with religion, specifically. Axtell 2019 Chapter 6 develops these points 
much more fully.  
14 Leeuwen (2014, 699). Leeuwen’s contrast of “belief” and (religious) “credence” is markedly 
in contrast with the B-C dualists, whose account of the stability of faith implies a negative 
answer to Leeuwen’s question, but who also take B-taken evidence to result in full-blown belief. 
Leeuwen’s division has much surface agreement with Buchak’s. and both endorse what Carter, 
Jarvis, and Rubin (2016) refer to as “doxastic state pluralism.” But for Leeuwen, religious 
‘credences’ as something closer to “avowals,” do not require a doxastic interpretation, and show 
marks that sometimes disqualify it as belief. When that is the case the content is pushed from 
‘believing that’ (qua theologically orthodox) to what is better described as ‘believing in.’ This 
seems like a plausible interpretation of B-taken evidence in contrast to C-taken evidence, but the 
B-C dualists import a propositional faith focus when they apply their dualism and insist on B-
taken evidence as (often) rational grounds for agents to in assent to particular propositions 
including “historical” ones. 
15 The comparative validity of the invoked model of faith becomes an issue, as it seems to 
confuse faith’s riskiness just with counter-inductive (yet full-blooded) belief. The most 
comparatively valid or generic conception of faith is arguably one which does involve an 
abiding active commitment, but which does not necessarily involve strong doctrinal 
components (let alone doctrinal beliefs of a “historical” nature. See Howard-Synder 2016, and 
Howard-Snyder, Daniel and McKaughan (2020a and 2020b and 2020c), especially in critique 
of Buchak’s account of faith as lacking adequate breadth and thus comparative value.  
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16 A qualification is in order. Some recent papers by Jackson suggest she now endorses a kind 
of belief-first reductionism. Unless I am missing something, this would be inconsistent with the 
“dualist” or “pluralist” description of her views. So, I am setting those papers aside and just 
treating those which articulate B-C dualism even if this was just an early formulation of her 
views 
17 For development see Axtell 2019, chapter 5: "The Pattern Stops Here?" Along with topics 
such as contingency anxiety, indoctrination anxiety or their absence which psychology 
sometimes studies across domains of controversial views, the tensions between evidentially 
underdetermined propositions and belief-avowals or self-ascriptions needs closer, and 
empirically-informed study by religious and non-religious philosophers alike. This overlaps 
with concerns that narrative testimony has characteristics which militate against its reduction to 
ordinary testimony. But the more general point for our present discussion is that 
epistemologists have too often taken agents self-ascriptions of beliefs as a given, and attempted 
only to evaluate the epistemic the mix standing of particular beliefs. Doxastic state pluralism 
challenges this assumption, as well and should: an agent’s state and not just the standing can be 
studied, but the delineation categorization of doxastic and sub- doxastic states is conducted 
largely  scientifically.  A-reasoning brings these interests together; I elsewhere define their 
intersection as the study of SAST Effects, or State and Standing Tension Effects: 
(SAST) The effects (reported or indicated) of unresolved tension in an agent’s thought 
process brought on by a combination of: 
a) the underdetermination of historical evidence for a justification of faith, and 
b) the overdetermination by multiple trait-dependent factors for taking purported special 
revelation to supply well-grounded historical /empirical beliefs. 
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18 Of course, everything can be said to dump into C-evidence eventually. But then, the other 
two can make a similar claim. So, we can set that further notion of dominance by one of the 
three aside. But here are some further bullet-pointed thoughts about A-taken evidence: 
• The A/C relationship directly informs the project of religious epistemics; it informs 
the assessment both of the rationality and standing of agents’ beliefs, not just in the religious 
domain, but in domains of controversial views more generally.  
• A-evidence bearing upon religious language and its functions, whether 
acknowledged by the agent or not, contributes to and the C evidence that agent has or has 
available. But in doing so it bears upon religious belief broadly, rather than on particular 
faith-based commitments. 
• A-evidence, as more externalist than an agent’s self-described B evidence, draws 
upon CSR on its scientific side, and upon social epistemology and study of risk, luck, safety, 
sensitivity, etc. on its complementary philosophic side. 
• If the agent takes B reasons as epistemically sufficient when they are not, the agent 
may be enkratic; if they reject the need for epistemic justification for their religious beliefs 
then their doxastic strategy is weakly or strongly fideistic. 
• The A/C relationship directly informs the project of religious epistemics, and 
assessment both of the states and standings of agents not just in the religious domain, but in 
domains of controversial views more generally.  
• A-evidence bearing upon religious language and its functions, whether 




                                                                                                                                                                                     
• A-evidence, as more externalist than an agent’s self-described B evidence, draws 
upon CSR on its scientific side, in the social epistemology and study of risk, luck, safety, 
sensitivity, etc. on its complementary philosophic side. 
Finally, A-reasoning is closely tied with inductive reasoning because: 
• causal inference is inductive inference, and externalist concerns about abilities and 
dispositions, safety, sensitivity, truth-tracking, aptness, etc. are mainly concerns about the 
truth-linked causal aetiology of belief in actual agents. Without A-reasoning, we couldn’t 
have the ‘Arrow of Causation’; nor would the drawing of generalizations or the use of 
analogy/disanalogy be constrained by empirical evidence.  
• Generalizations and applied generalizations are inductive, and the grounds we have for 
attributing  moral and intellectual character-traits to ourselves and others depend upon 
recognition of  generalizations and predictions based upon them. Without A-reasoning we 
couldn’t have grounds for Attribution of traits to ourselves or others. 
19 We might want to distinguish, as Attribution theory does, between theory grounded in 
psychology and human sciences (the results of science), and ‘folk’ trait-attribution as a focus of 
study in psychology and the human sciences. A-reasoning is inductive and scientific because it 
studies valid generalizations about human psychographics, and how, in acquired beliefs, people 
draw more and less sound generalizations about other people’s moral and intellectual character-
traits, and, make more and less sound predictions about others’ motives and actions. When 
unsound, the folk attribute traits to insiders and outsiders on a counter-inductive basis, where 
patterns and symmetries are ignored or neglected, and unprincipled asymmetric trait-ascriptions 
are substituted in ways which suggest that personal or social bias, rather than shared, objective 
evidence, is a best explainer. 
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   20 Larson, 2020, np. 
 
21 “Christianity is not based on a historical truth, but presents us with a (historical) narrative & 
says: now believe! But not, believe this report with the belief that is appropriate to historical 
report,—but rather: believe, through thick & thin & you can do this only as an outcome of a 
life. Here you have a narrative, don’t take the same attitude to it as you take other 
historical narratives! Make a quite different place in your life for it. --There is no paradox 
about that!”  ….“Queer as it sounds: the historical accounts of the Gospels might, in the 
historical sense, be demonstrably false, & yet belief would lose nothing through this: but not 
because it has to do with 'universal truths of reason'! rather, because historical proof (the 
historical proof-game) is irrelevant to belief. This message (the Gospels) is seized on by a 
human being believingly (i.e. lovingly): That is the certainty of this "taking-for-true", nothing 
else.” (CV 37-38; WCW editors citation MS 120 83 c: 8-9.12.1937). 
22 Lycan 1971, 110. Lycan goes on criticize several philosophers and their versions of a 
criterial conception of truth and knowledge. 
23 In Lakatosian terms, by decision the ‘hard core’ of one’s research programme is 
comparatively more stable than the person’s commitment to either auxiliary assumptions or the 
more specific claims of the ‘protective belt.’ Yet even a ‘hard core’ may change somewhat over 
time, and some programs will be abandoned if they are no longer live options to those who 
once adhered to them. But the bed isn’t so thin as to be a capturable in a single-proposition, as 
James tries to do with the “religious hypothesis” and its counter-point, the “naturalistic 
hypothesis.” While James would easily accept that this effort is merely a rational 
reconstruction, for the purpose of dialogue, of beliefs accepted on other than probative 
reasoning, Wittgenstein’s use of “language game” as previously mentioned, suggests a that it is 
a “whole system” (OC §141) or “nest of propositions” (§225). While both were holistic 
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thinkers, this special emphasis by Wittgenstein led him to be perhaps less concerned about 
ongoing revisions among what James termed religious “overbeliefs,” or direct responses to a 
materialist challenge to supernaturalism. But at the same time Wittgenstein seems more 
concerned with probing himself over whether fideistic faith’s “irritation to the intellect” can be 
assuaged in another way than conflating the “certainty” of faith with having compelling 
grounds, which presumably is a form of bewitchment by means of language. But it is not a 
matter of being in good religious faith meaning to be in bad philosophical faith, as this might 
suggest. The confusion is already bad religious faith to begin with, since it both asserts and 
denies epistemic/alethic risk at the same time and in the same respect.  
24 Kusch and McKenna (2018, 598) argue that “Wittgenstein is an ally [of genealogical 
methods,] since he opposes conceptual analysis in terms of necessary and sufficient 
conditions, studies the function of concepts, and introduces the category of family-
resemblance concepts.” Genealogical methods can be a form of critique. See also Koopman 
(2011) on Foucault and Dewey’s genealogical methods. Still, while Wittgenstein insists on 
“taking account” of the context of language games, he does not think they should be 
reductively “explained” by philosophers (a philosopher’s disease) through focus on a small 
set of potentially one-sided examples (PI §593). 
25 Queloz 2021, p. 16, note 32. See also Baker and Hacker (2009) and Savickey (2014) on this 
important theme in Wittgenstein. Queloz examines the normative significance of genealogical 
accounts, what in particular he terms “pragmatic genealogies.” He develops “a systematic 
account of pragmatic genealogies as dynamic models serving to reverse-engineer the points of 
ideas in relation not only to near-universal human needs, but also to socio-historically situated 
needs.” Back cover. 
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26 Queloz, 2021, back cover  
27 Queloz develops Wittgenstein’s genealogical methods together with a broader critique of 
people’s pronounced tendencies (found especially in theology and philosophy), “to 
dehistoricize and denaturalize what they respect” (102). But genealogies are not strictly 
explanatory, and are shown to often be used for ameliorative purposes, and to exhibit 
vindicatory and not just debunking aspects. Sometimes – and perhaps at its best-- “genealogy is 
conceptual reverse-engineering in the service of ameliorative conceptual engineering” (194). 
28 CV p. 3. To recognize A-reasoning as epistemologically significant for the study of 
religious belief does not at all mean that a descriptive account of religious assent in any direct 
or general way ‘debunks’ B-reasoning, or undercuts the positive epistemic status of belief 
which religious believers self-ascribe. Rather, A-reasoning affirms the widespread use of 
pragmatic reasoning (will, emotion, values), and its reasonableness in most cases for the 
functions which religious identity and value bring for religious practitioners. But it does mean 
recognizing that agents differ in how fideistic conception of faith is, their attitude to reason, 
science, philosophy, etc. and that serious, non-overbroad aetiological challenges to the warrant 
or well-foundedness of belief are possible in the religious domain, just as in the philosophical, 
the moral, and the political domains. Neither pragmatic reasoning nor psychological description 
of agents and their varying conceptions of faith, nor CSR evidence bearing on pointing to 
affective origins, is ‘belief-centered’ or focused on propositional attitudes in the way that C-
reasoning is. Apart from reductions of epistemology (or the ethics of belief) to proposition-
focused internalism, their epistemological value is not in question, and B-reasoning and A-
reasoning each affirm the importance of the other rather than negating it. See Axtell 2019 
Chapters 3 & 5 for more on Testimonial Authority Assumption, describable in terms of ascent 
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up the “faith-ladder,” and other aspects of James’ William James thesis of psychological 
fideism. 
29 There are, of course, various strategies for a ‘symmetry-breaking’ response to the aetiological 
symmetries and generalizations which comparative studies draw upon. PRL examined these 
responses in relationship to specific religious apologetic strategies, internalist and externalist 
and so forth. My more recent papers begin with the need for an epistemology for domains of 
controversial views (political, moral, philosophical, and religious worldviews) as distinct from 
everyday beliefs, and with the normative concerns of “risk-aware” social epistemology, able to 
diagnose bias and to address growing concerns over belief polarization, echo chambers, 
radicalization or fundamentalist tendencies, etc. 
 
30 Pittard (2019) adopts a related methodological stance on which philosophy should avoid 
commitment to a rigorous epistemic impartiality which leads to disagreement-motivated 
religious skepticism, as well as to any account of disagreement or testimony which treats as 
unproblematic the privileging of one' first-personal perspective.  
